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The purpose of this thesis was to seek out the opinion
of the Procurement Contracting Officers within the Department
of Defense as to their perceptions of the effectiveness of
DOD's Profit Policy. This was accomplished by means of a
questionnaire sent to PCO ' s at 25 major buying commands
within DOD. The results of the survey showed that PCO's
felt that (1) profit policy was ineffective in incentivizing
contractor investment; (2) facilities capital and the
productivity reward were having little or no effect on con-
tractor investment; (3) program instability and the impact
of socio-economic programs on the contracting process were
major contributors to profit policy's ineffectiveness; (4)
DOD Profit Policy did not have a high priority in their
organizations
.
Recommendations are made concerning methods for improving
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Today the Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing
continuing growth in the cost of its major weapons systems
and their required spare parts and support materials [16].
In an attempt to mitigate these increasing costs, DOD is
using profit policy as a tool to incentivize defense con-
tractors to invest in more productive plant and equipment,
and more efficient production methods. Since its inception
in 196 3 present Profit Policy has been the subject of in-
tense and continued research. Most of the research appears
to focus on the theoretical and defense contractor points
of view [21, 24, 44], Very little appears to have been
done in researching the profit policy from the point of
view of Government contracting personnel. The purpose of
this study is to take a segment of the Government contracting
personnel, the Procurement Contracting Officers (PCO) , and
determine their opinions on the Profit Policy's effective-
ness in accomplishing its objectives.
It is hoped that this study will help fill a small
portion of the void in the research on profit policy. A
more thorough understanding of the PCO ' s view of profit
policy will hopefully provide to decision makers determining
the future course of profit policy an extra added insight.

Additionally, the problems and strengths outlined by the
PCO's should provide another perspective on ways to improve
or increase profit policy's effectiveness.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding general objectives, the following
primary research question was posed: How do Department of
Defense Procurement Contracting Officers view the effective-
ness of DOD's Profit Policy?
The following ancilliary research questions are deemed
pertinent in addressing the basic research question:
What is the present DOD Profit Policy?
What is its history and background?
What are its current problems?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research effort is primarily concerned with the
acquisition by DOD of weapon systems, spare parts and re-
quired support materials. Within this set the scope is
narrowed to those situations where true price competition
does not exist and cost analysis is necessary to assure
True price competition can be defined by the following
criteria:
a. The specifications of the item or service to be
purchased are explicitly clear to both buyer and seller.
b. The market consists of an adequate number of sellers
c. The sellers comprising the market activity want the
contract and are therefore willing to price competitively
to get it.
d. The time available is sufficient for using this
method of purchasing. [42:178]

that the Government is receiving a fair price. It is within
these confines that profit policy operates.
The study of DOD's Profit Policy is an extremely broad
and complex subject. Interpretation of this policy can be
effected by one's point of view. All those who are touched
by the policy, the policy makers, the policy implementers
,
and the defense contractors, may view a particular problem
in three totally different ways that may be equally valid.
Also, the defense market consists of an extremely hetero-
geneous group of contractors who range from those heavily
dependent on DOD contracts to those whose Government business
is a small portion of their business. Additionally this
range of contractors makes a diverse list of products— semi-
conductors to ships. These complexities have a direct
bearing on profit policy effectiveness but are beyond the
limits of this research. This study focuses on a small
segment of the policy implementers, the PCO ' s . It is hoped
that by concentrating on this group, pertinent information
will be generated for inclusion in the data base on profit
policy.
This study assumes that the reader commands a general
knowledge or familiarity with DOD contracting language, and
the defense acquisition process. Additionally it is further
assumed that the reader possesses a basic understanding of




The research methodology utilized in this study consisted
of two basic components: (1) development of a literature base,
and (2) a survey of DOD PCO ' s . The literature base was mainly
compiled through the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange, the Naval Postgraduate School Library, and a review
of various journals and periodicals which concern themselves
with Government acquisition. The questionnaire was sent to
PCO's in the Departments of the Air Force, Army, Navy and in
the Defense Logistics Agency. The data collected from the
questionnaire are displayed in tables throughout the study.
The questionnaire itself is included as Appendix B.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This study attempts to take the reader through the subject
at hand in the most logical manner possible. Chapter II is
designed to give the reader a brief view of the defense market
and the external factors that can have a bearing on it. A
review of the defense market will hopefully provide an under-
standing of the environment in which profit policy seeks to
operate. In Chapter Three the historical outline and develop-
ment of the current policy will be chronologically traced.
Additionally, current problems with the policy will be high-
lighted. This will present a background from which to review
the results of the questionnaire as contained in Chapter IV.





Before embarking on any meaningful discussion of DOD '
s
Profit Policy and its effectiveness as viewed by DOD Procure-
ment Contracting Officers, certain key concepts and infor-
mation must be presented. First there are certain salient
factors that are normally considered outside the realm of
contracting officers that can have significant direct or
indirect effects on profit policy and its effectiveness.
Second, a review of the "Defense Market" will provide a close
look at its characteristics in order to give sufficient
background to review profit policy.
B. IMPORTANT ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The acquisition of defense weaponry is a very complex
process. It takes place in a fluid environment that contains
factors that can have direct effects on defense procurement.
It is important to understand and be aware of these factors
for not only do they impact the acquisition process but
contracting personnel by their decisions can influence or
change these environmental factors.
Probably the most visible factor is the level of inter-
national tension. The decade of the 1970's provides a good
example. Early in the decade as the Vietnam War wound down,
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the U.S. and the Soviet Union began negotiating Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaties and developing a policy of detente.
This apparent lessening of tension brought a shift in the
American view of Defense and therefore the acquisition of
defense material. Congress and the American people became
more interested in expanding social programs, improving the
environment, etc. Why should there be increases in spending
for military hardware if we are becoming more friendly with
our enemies? This attitude had a definite impact by 19 75
when the Defense Procurement Account was at its lowest point
since the post World War II demobilization [17:63]. By the
end of 19 79 the level of world tension had changed. Americans
had been taken hostage in Iran and the Soviets had occupied
Afganistan. The impact of such a turn around becomes evident
when reviewing the amount of money spent for military procure-
ment in the last decade but especially FY79 to FY81 (Figure 1)
Another important factor in the defense acquisition en-
vironment is the political importance of DOD ' s procurement
outlays. Depending on the swing of international tension
and the perceived attitude of the American public, either
we are spending too much and wasting our national resources
or not enough is being spent to ensure adequate national
security.
In comprehending this political sensitivity to defense
and defense spending, it is important to understand why











Figure 1. Trends in the Defense Procurraent Budget
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of this country. The amount of money spent in the defense
acquisition arena and its perceived controllability commands
attention. In FY 19 81 the Defense Department plans to spend
$52.8 billion of its $158 billion budget on buying weapons
systems and their ancillary support items. The size and
therefore the importance of the defense acquisition budget
may not be so great when compared to the overall Federal
Budget but this changes rapidly when one considers control-
ability. The controllability of the Federal Budget has
been decreasing throughout the decade of the 70' s (See
Figure 2) . [11:239]


























In the FY 19 81 budget proposal, the uncontrollables accounted
for 76.6 per cent of all requested authorizations. Of the
remaining 2 3.4 per cent, 61 per cent was made up of military
spending £11:239], This apparent controllability of
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military spending is very important to the members of
Congress. It is much easier and less emotional to argue
the merits of and needs for an additional ship or more
tanks or airplanes than to discuss the implications of cur-
tailing a particular social program. Politically it is
unpalatable to discuss starving or uneducated children or
senior Americans freezing during the winter.
The uncertainity and complexity of the defense of this
country make it hard for anyone to accurately foretell the
impact of any changes made in spending for defense weaponry.
The long time required to develop and buy any weapons system
also puts the possible consequences out into the future seven
to ten years. This allows a politician plenty of time to
adjust his position. The amount of money spent and its
controllability, and the relative ease in discussing the
issues make the defense budget, especially the weapons
procurement portion, a very attractive candidate for poli-
tical manipulation and intrigue,
A new and unique characteristic of the defense acqui-
sition environment is the equal funding of "guns and butter."
Throughout the history of our contry involvement in a con-
flict or war has meant that all the energies of the nation
were channeled toward winning the war. Good examples of
this would be the Civil War, and World Wars I and II. With
the coming of the Korean conflict the ground rules seemed
to change. Instead of being declared a war, it was
16
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maintained as a police action and therefore did not qualify
for total mobilization. In fact its impact on the civilian
sector was minimal and rationing was not employed [17.64],
According to Mr. J. S. Gansler:
War was not to interfere with the civil section,
unless it was to be "WWIII." The question of
guns or butter was to be answered by "both". [17:64]
This idea of both "guns and butter" continues today.
The Vietnam War was carried on at the same time President
Johnson was developing and implementing a plethora of ex-
pensive social programs. This apparent desire of the
American government and people to pursue both social pro-
grams and high levels of military spending are very important
when reviewing any portion of the defense acquisition en-
vironment. As weapons systems become more and more expen-
sive (aircraft carrier—$2 billion, aircraft—$25 million)
and as the cost of social programs continue to increase due
to their indexing to the cost of living, the country may
find that it can not afford both "guns and butter."
The nation's sensitivity to war profiteering is one of
the constant parts of the defense acquisition environment.
The idea of "Profiteering during war is a recurrent pheno-
menon that can be traced back to the earliest civilizations."
[22:1] Indeed throughout the early history of the United
States, there have been examples of both Government officials
and industrial companies reaping undue gain from the nation's
conflicts. During the Civil War, President Lincoln removed
17
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his Secretary of War for various corrupt dealings with
Government contractors. Also it is alleged that many of
the nineteenth century capitalists CJ. P. Morgan, Cornelius
Vanderbilt and the du Ponts) made their first fortunes
during the war from Government contracts [22:8]. Even
though it appears that war profiteering has been of concern
throughout history, World War I, the war to end all wars,
generated war profiteering to end all war profiteering. The
extent of the war profiteering came to light during the
period between the two world wars. The attention to war
profits generated such slogans as "Merchants of Death" and
"Lets Take the Profits Out of War" and in 19 34 resulted in
the Senate creating a Special Committee on Investigations
of the Munitions Industry [22:12].
The significance of this sensitivity to war profiteering
is not whether there actually were excess profits made or
that people were convicted of wrong doing, but that this
sensitivity resulted in changes in the acquisition environ-
ment. From this era came legislation that is still being
felt today—The Vinson Trammel Act of 19 34— limits profits
by statute and the creation of a renegotiations board to
review the profits of defense contractors.
World War II brought a great many changes to the world
— the atom bomb, destruction of colonial empires, the V-2
rocket, etc. According to Richard Kaufman, it:
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. . .brought the end of what might be termed the
classical era of war and peace, when wars had a
beginning and an end and war profiteering rose
and fell accordingly. The advent of the Cold
War changed all that. The Federal Government
has spent money for military purposes at wartime
levels since 1951 and will continue to do so
for the foreseeable future... [22: XV]
Though this characterization may be extreme or even inaccurate,
it does point out that there has been a lot of change in the
defense spending patterns. This continuing high level of
spending has brought about many safeguards that inhibit ex-
cessive profits. The following is a list of some of these
safeguards
.
1. Truth in Negotiations Act with Defective
Pricing Provisions (Public Law 87-653)
2. FAR Cost Principles Applicable to Fixed-Price
Type Contracts (DAR 15-106)
3. Cost Accounting Standards (Public Law 91-379)
4. Weighted Guideline method of evaluating profit
by Contracting Officers (DAR 3-808)
5. Strengthened procurement oversight organiza-
tions. (DCAA, GAO, DCAS)
The above mentioned safeguards notwithstanding, the fear
of and distaste for "excessive" profits on defense contracts
is still prevalent and held by people in very high positions.
One of the more vituperative orations on war profiteering
in recent history was delivered by Representative Henry B.
Gonzales of Texas during the Congressional review of the
need for a uniform cost accounting system. He is quoted as
saying:
The profiteers who intentionally gouge the govern-
ment for excessive profits during a time of war
19

are also guilty of consciously withdrawing efficiency
from our industrial capacity. These private business-
men profiteers are in reality guilty of sabotage.
Our history has been one of rampant war profiteering
and I am convinced that even the limited annual
reports of the Renegotiation Board reveal that
profiteering is going on now, is increasing, and
will continue to increase unless something more
realistic is done to stop it. [43:130]
Another perennial critic of defense contractors and war
profiteering is Senator William Proxmire who believed that
"contractors (were) reaping huge hidden profits and that
Pentagon procurement policies have institutionalized
profiteering" [33:44], Also during the Congressional fight
over continuing the Renegotiations Board, President Carter
favored continuing and strengthening the Board in order to
"bear down hard on excessive profits in government contracts."
[4:4].
It has become obvious that all parties involved in the
acquisition of defense material should be responsive to both
the electorate and elected officials distaste for excessive
profits. If this distaste grows to be a national issue as
it did in the period between the two world wars, it could
manifest itself in the form of new rules, regulations, or
laws that could have long term effects on the acquisition
process, such as the Vinson Trammel Act which is still
active today
.
A final aspect of the acquisition environment that will
become more important as the competition between "guns and
butter" intensifies, is the acquisitions perceived efficiency.
20

Whether the process is efficient or not, is not the issue.
The important topic is how the electorate and elected
officials view the efficiency of the process. If the popular
view of this issue becomes a national cause, it could very
well end up producing long term changes in the acquisition
process as did the anti-war profiteering fad between the
two world wars
.
A review of the literature shows that it is becoming an
increasing concern of the public and is being studied by
academicians. In a recent Gallop Newsweek Poll, 72 percent
of the respondents felt that the money spent by DOD is spent
inefficiently [28:50]. Such feelings will not be lost on
Congressmen and should be sobering to those in the acquisition
business. Also in his voluminous dissertation entitled The
Diminishing Economic and Strategic Viability of the U.S.
Defense Industrial Base , Jacques S. Gansler emphatically
states and proves that:
...the resources of the defense industry, i.e.,
the "factors of production" (labor, capital,
materials, etc.) are not being efficiently or
effectively utilized. [17:1]
The preceding descriptions of the forces operating in
the Defense Acquisition Environment were not meant to be
all inclusive but to show that items often considered beyond
the scope of acquisition can definitely effect it. Con-
versely it should not be lost on individual implementers
of DOD policies that a very few individual actions or
21

contracts can have an impact on such forces in the acquisition
environment. This becomes evident in reviewing findings of
the Nye Committee which found that a few acts by individuals
or corporations did result in excess profits [22:10-20].
Instead of prosecuting the violators, the result was that
new statutes (Vinson-Trammel: Renegotiations Act) were
enacted to cover all participants in the defense market.
So it is vital for all personnel involved in buying weapons
for DOD be aware of the environment in which they are
working.
C. DEFENSE MARKET
In its efforts to ensure the Nation's security, the
DOD spends billions of dollars to purchase needed systems
and material— $52.8 billion in FY 19 81. This spending of
such large sums of money for the Nation's defense creates
a unique market situation. It is within this unique
market that DOD's Profit Policy is implemented by Govern-
ment contracting personnel.
Peck and Scherer stated that "a market system in its
entirety can never exist for the acquisition of weapons
[32:57]. While Gansler went one step farther and de-
clared that:
The single major cause of the problems in the
defense industrial base today is the false
assumption that there is a "free market" in
operation - when, in fact, one does not exist,...
when policy makers on all sides of the military-
industrial structure attempt "corrective"
22

actions based upon the assumption of the
existence and operation of a free market.
[17:105].
This unique market can be characterized by four basic
criteria. A review of these criteria should provide a brief
picture of the present defense market.
First, the DOD spends large sums of money in buying
weapons and support items. DOD's procurement spending in
real dollars between FY72 and FY81 increased almost 25 per-
cent to $52.8 billion. Even more important is the fact that
the cost of defense weapons and related equipment is in-
creasing at an annual rate of 5 percent (excluding inflation)
[17 : 74]. Very few companies would have the financial cap-
ability to develop a major program by themselves. Compounding
the cost of a program is the present volatile nature of the
cost of money. With the prime rate fluctuating between 11
and 20 percent in a year's time, the cost of a major develop-
ment program could be prohibitive. In order for the govern-
ment to be able to purchase advanced weapons it must finance
the development and production costs. By doing this, the
U.S. Government has put itself in the role of investor and
buyer, a position seldom if ever seen in a normal market
[32:59].
Second, there are unique uncertainties inherent in the
defense market. Private investments in major DOD acquisi-
tions can be subjected to risks such as obsolescence,
changed strategic plans, changed government policy,
23

unforseen technical obstacles or changes, or funding changes.
Examples of the impact of these risks on past programs are
the Snark and Navaho missiles which were cancelled after the
expenditure of $700 million dollars on each. Their cancel-
lations were mainly due to the ascendency of the less
vulnerable ballistic missile [32:47]. A more publicized
example is the B-l bomber, cancelled on 30 June 19 77 only
7 months into Lot I production [24:33]. This change can be
related to changes in funding, strategic and governmental
policy.
In an attempt to mitigate the effects of these risks,
the Government spreads the risks among all taxpayers by
providing funds in the form of progress and advance payments.
Additionally, termination liability and Government furnished
plant and equipment are used to control a contractor's risk.
Despite the attempts of government to reduce the amount of
risk to which a defense contractor is exposed, the financial
community feels that low profits and high risk are character-
istics of the defense market that make it hard for defense
industries to secure long and short term financing [37],
Though efforts have been made to reduce risk in the defense
market, it would appear that the market still contains an
abnormal amount of risk.
Striving to curtail risk in the defense market through
the payment of Federal dollars, has lead the Government
to inject the concepts of public trust and careful
24

expenditure of taxpayers dollars. To protect its interests
in the acquisition process, the Government has added layers
of:
...Federal statutes, regulations, executive orders,
procuring agency directives, and judicial and ad-
ministrative rulings and decisions designed to
protect and to further Government acquisition in-
terests and policies, safeguard the judicious
expenditure of public funds, and help ensure the
Federal Government receives the best possible
products for its money [14:16].
This hands on approach by Government in the acquisition
process may protect its interests but it surely adds another
unique dimension to the defense market.
Finally the price for most weapons systems is not set in
a fashion normally associated with a supply and demand mar-
ket. The Government, being the only buyer in the defense
acquisition process, and exerting the control it does, finds
itself in the role of the sole buyer in a monopsony. Though
the government is able to see competition in the early de-
velopment of a program, once it selects a company to finish
developing and produce the system, the Government then finds
itself dealing with a monopolist. This relationship is further
removed from normal market relationships by the lack of sub-
stitutes, and the feeling among contractors that they will
fail if they don't have a major contract in house. This
leads both parties into the situation where both sides
feel they can not exist without the other. The pricing of
weapons systems that evolves from this environment is not
25

at all related to the competitive market but rather to such
artificial parameters as allowable costs, profit policy,
and various other Government pronouncements [32:60].
D . SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to portray forces in the
acquisition environment and defense market in such a way
that the reader gets a holistic view of them. It is inten-
ded that the complex nature of the acquisition world and
the interactions of the various forces be perceived. It
is within this complex universe that the Government strives
to acquire the best possible weapons systems and support
material. To help Government contracting personnel meet
this goal, DOD has developed a profit policy applied to all
negotiated contracts in an attempt to encourage efficient
efforts by defense contractors. The development of this
policy, its current position, and attendant problems will
be outlined in Chapter III.
26

III. POD PROFIT POLICY
A. DEVELOPMENT
Historically, purchasing by the Government has been on
the basis of price competition and as such negated any need
for a profit policy. It was felt that the competition in
the market place among independent contractors would result
in the Government receiving a fair and reasonable price.
There were wartime aberrations in this basic philosophy which
various bodies tried to deal with by means of excess profits
taxes, mandates for competition, and profit limitation
statutes. In spite of all the efforts to change or reform
the acquisition process to avoid excess profits it remained
based on the requirement for price competition with little
specific guidance on how to handle situations where there
was no true price competition.
During the Revolutionary War supplies and material were
purchased using such vehicles as requisitions, commissions,
and non- competitive contracts. In 1782 as a result of fraud,
negligence, and waste of public property, Robert Morris, the
Superintendent of Finance, directed that advertised competi-
tive bidding be used in the purchasing of Government material
[22:7]. Abuses continued and Congress continued to press
harder for the pre-eminence of competitive bidding in the
award of Government contracts. These efforts in the early
27

1800 's finally culminated with the Civil Sundry Appropriation
Act of 1861 which strongly stressed the need for competitive
bidding. This Act (later called "Revised Statute 3709) with
three major revisions remained the basic procurement statute
until the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. This Act
codified the many exceptions to the required competitive
bidding on Government contracts. These exceptions had grown
out of the need to buy a substantial amount of material in
a short time to get the country ready for WWI and II.
The competitive bid process began to break down as the
United States tried to mobilize the World War I. Competitive
bidding contracts entailed a long and tedious process that
did not lend itself to meeting the country's urgent need to
get ready for war. As a result many unique military items
were bought using negotiated cost plus a percentage of cost
contracts (CPPC) . In a CPPC contract, the profit or fee
was determined by applying a fixed percentage to the costs
incurred. Therefore if costs went up, profits went up, and
if costs went down so did profits. This approach to con-
tracting resulted in such abuses that during the period
between the wars, Congress considered 200 bills and resolu-
tions aimed at controlling war profits and improving the
purchasing system. Due to differences between Congress
and the Executive Branch no major improvements to the
procurement system were brought forth [19:7].
28

The Government entered the mobilization for WWII with a
"hodge podge" of directives, statutes and regulations that
had been collecting on the books since the Civil War. But
as the war got closer to America, Congress eased the re-
quirements for competitive bidding and put a percentage
ceiling on the fees that could be applied to cost reimburse-
ment contracts. In implementing the First War Powers Act
of 1941, the War Production Board, a group of industrialists
and Government officials appointed by President Roosevelt
to assure the most effective prosecution of war procurement
and production, directed the abandonment of competitive
bidding in favor of negotiating contracts. The procurement
process became more concerned with the mobilization needs
of delivery, quality and sources I8:522j.
After the war, the Congress in an effort to consolidate
the multidudinous statutes, regulations, etc., governing the
DOD acquisition process into one manageable package passed
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. The Act and
its implementing regulation, the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations reaffirmed the dominance of competitive bidding
but provided definite rules and guidance on how to handle
negotiated contracts. Present day DOD Profit Policy had its
beginnings in the first edition of ASPR. That early edition
of ASPR stated that DOD must:
...apply contracting policies and methods designed
to create an environment in which industry can
realize profits on defense business which are high
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enough to give reasonable assurance of long
term availability to DOD industrial support by
the best companies and to enable those defense
contractors to attract sufficient equity and
borrowed capital [29:3],
Even though ASPR brought structure to the DOD acquisition
process, profit policy was still an unguided child.
During the 1950 's, the Profit Policy outlined in ASPR
developed into a narrative form that lacked specificity on
the relationship between the elements to be considered when
arriving at the appropriate profit level for a negotiated
contract [25]. The varied nature of the nine profit policy
factors made the contracting personnel's consideration of
them a sizeable problem. (See Figure 3)
The Profit Policies inadequacies became highly visible
in the early 60' s. The Senate Committee on Government
Operations, then known as the McClellan Committee, was in-
vestigating the Missile Procurement Program. The Committee
found that prime contractors and their subcontractors were
pyramiding profits and thus gaining unearned profits. The
publicity from this investigation and other concurrent
Effective competition
Degree of risk
Nature of work to be performed
Extent of government assistance
Extent of contractors investments




Figure 3. Profit Policy Factors
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studies done internally to DOD, resulted in the Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) being tasked to study DOD ' s Profit
Policy. The objective of the study was:
...to develop a rational, workable uniform and
equitable approach to target profits which will
result in a wider range of profits. The study
aims to develop specific guidelines to assist
contracting personnel in arriving at appropriate
profit ratios to further national and departmental
interests utilizing the profit motive of DOD
contractors [25 :±].
In reviewing DOD s Profit Policy and its implementation,
LMI found that the predominant factor used by Government
contracting personnel in determining profit or fee on a
negotiated contract was "the profit or fee rate which had
been established in earlier contracts with a specific service."
[25:44] The contracting officers would then use the most
advantageous of the nine profit factors listed in Figure 3
to adjust the base fee rate to appropriately reflect the
procurement situation at hand. The importance of the integrity
of the base fee rate was evident in one case reviewed by LMI.
One contractor took a contract without any fee rather than
accept a rate lower than his "historical rate" [25:44], But
not only did contractors have a strong tie to the historical
fee or profit rate, the Government contracting personnel
did also. This tendency was related to the necessity for
any upward deviation from the historical rate to be completely
justified. So an apparent desire to play it safe or not rock
the boat lead to the use of the historical rate [25:49].
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LMI also found that even though contractor investment
is listed in ASPR as one of the nine profit factors to be
used in determining fee or profit, it was not used. The
lack of use was apparently based on the difficulty:
...in defining the term "investment", the
difficulty in measuring the amount of investment
involved and the tendency to compare one con-
tractor with another contractor and hence work
from averages [25.31].
Additionally LMI*s study indicated that many procurement
officials mentioned that a contractor's investment was often
a criteria used in the source selection process and not by
contracting officers negotiating fee or profit [25:31],
The plentiful number of contractors competing for defense
contracts was taken as an indicator by LMI that there was
not any problem in attracting capital to defense business.
These findings and conclusions lead LMI to reject the idea
of using contractor investment alone in determining profit
or fee [25:59],
LMI considered a public utility approach, and an im-
proved narrative format and rejected these along with the
return on investment in favor of a Weighted Guidelines (WGL)
approach. Figure 4 outlines the major elements of LMI '
s
proposal. The WGL were an analytical method of implementing
the profit factors listed in Figure 3. The desire to retain
the current factors was due to their general acceptance by
Government and industry and the perception that any sub-












General and Administrative Expense
b. Contractor's Assumption of Contract Cost Risk
1. Type, obligations, pricing provisions
of contract
c. Record of Contractor's Performance
1. Management
2. Cost Efficiency
3. Reliability of Cost Estimates
4. Timely Deliveries





1. Source of Resources
a. Government or Contractor
Source of Financial, Material
and Technical Resources
2. Special Achievement, if any,
Required in Contract
a. Technical or Other Achievement
3. Other
Figure 4. LMI ' s Weighted Guideline Proposal
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considerable liaison, education, and acceptance by others
than the Department of Defense" [25:62].
LMI's recommendations were accepted by DOD and became a
part of ASPR in August of 196 3. Not six months after the
introduction of the WGL, members of a Defense Industry
Advisory Council Working Group on unallowable costs criticized
the WGL for not adequately considering the financial re-
sources used by contractors. In rebuttal of these charges,
LMI published a report that concluded that the weight given
to contractor investment was significant even if it was in-
direct and imprecise. The report went on and delineated
four ways in which the WGL accounted for contractor invest-
ment:
1. The source of resource factors.
2. Different profit rates for in-house costs
and the cost of purchased materials.
3. Profit rates applied to depreciation.
4. Profit rates applied to total costs (costs
and investments tend to increase and decline
together as demonstrated by a statistical
study of aerospace companies) [21:7].
DOD renewed its interest in contractor investment when
it directed LMI to conduct a survey on this subject. The
results of this study contradicted their 196 4 report on
contractor investment under the weighted guidelines. In
196 7 LMI found that the WGL had a negative incentive for
contractors to invest. As contract prices went down so did
profits. Conversely as costs went up so did profits. The
study concluded that the WGL provided incentives for the
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contractor not to invest in cost reducing plant and equipment
but to allow costs to escalate. This ran counter to the fact
that cost reducing efforts on defense contracts was in the
Nation's best interest. LMI recommended that the WGL be
expanded to allow profit objectives to be determined by cost
and assets applied. The proposed solution went on to state
that the assets to use in determining profit should be
operating and facilities capital [31-110].
The theme of LMI ' s study was picked up and carried along
by many others. In a 19 71 study, GAO found that:
...by relating profits to costs, contractors in
non-competitive situations are not provided with
positive incentives to make investments in
equipment that would increase efficiency and
result in reduced costs, especially where follow-
on contracts are involved. Under the current
system of negotiating contract prices such in-
vestments tend to lower, rather than increase,
profits in the long run [40:2].
Soon after the GAO report was published, Lowell H. Goodhue,
a senior fellow at LMI stated a similar view.
The familiar competitive market incentive for cost
reductions is a combination of profit on new
capital invested, improved profit margins, and
the expectation of increased sales from reduced
selling prices. But on negotiated defense con-
tracts, profit dollars tend to go down in
proportion to cost reductions— lower costs do
not generally result in proportionate increases
in DOD's orders for an item. Under these con-
ditions, there is obvious pressure for a contractor
to avoid reducing expected costs [18:98].
In his doctoral dissertation, J, E. Kasputys reviewed
the influence of DOD's profit policies on contractor manage-
ment. He conducted an in depth on-site review of two major
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contractors and circulated additional questionnaires to
other contractors and procurement agencies in the DOD . One
of the hypotheses he tested was:
DOD Profit Policies provide an incentive to con-
tractors to make fewer cost reduction investments
in defense work than in comparable commercial
work [21:34].
He found considerable support for this hypothesis. Of the
two companies he examined, one of them incorporated the
profit policy's disincentive for investment into their
capital budgeting decisions for cost reducing improvements.
Additionally he found that commercial organizational entities
invested 40% more for cost reduction than comparable defense
entities and that as the percentage of negotiated contract
work increased a defense contractor tended to invest even
less for cost reduction purposes £21:32].
In response to all the criticism of the WGL, DOD by
early 19 72 had developed a Profit on Capital Policy. The
effort that led to the formulation of this policy was
fathered by the 196 7 LMI study on needed changes to the
WGL. Soon after the LMI study an ASPR subcommittee was es-
tablished to develop WGL procedures for considering the
capital utilized by a defense contractor in determining
profit objectives. In 19 70 the subcommittee procedures
were successfully tested on a sample of 175 contracts.
The procedures directed that negotiated profit objectives
be based 50% on cost and 50% on capital allocated to the
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contract [31:110]. Although the Profit on Capital Policy
was generally supported by Government and industry in the
early stages of development, when it appeared in the ASPR,
it received very little use. It was later determined that
the policy failed because its use had been made optional
and that it was too complex [3:45]. Even though this policy
did not see fruition, it was a step in the right direction.
B. CURRENT POLICY
Even though DOD ' s Profit on Capital Policy failed, there
was still concern over the disincentives in DOD's Profit
Policy. Additionally by the raid 19 70's there was some con-
cern in DOD over the softness of the defense industrial
base, its apparent low level of investment and low profit-
ability [37:7]. In May 1975, then Deputy Secretary of
Defense William P. Clements chartered a study to review in
detail these characteristics. The goal of the study, Profit
76, was to "develop any policy revisions considered necessary
to encourage private investment in equipment and the associa-
ted reductions in costs [37:8]. In order to fully under-
stand the problem area, the study group looked at the earn-
ings and investments of comparable defense and commercial
industries. At the same time opinions on profit issues
were garnered from Government and industry. Organizations
such as the General Accounting Office, the Cost Accounting
Standards Board, and the Office of Federal Procurement
37

Policy were extensively consulted. Additionally 133 defense
contractors provided their thoughts, as well as financial
data £37:8].
The first step taken by the study group was a review of
investment and earnings of comparable defense and commercial
business. The results were divided into two areas. First
it was found that when profitability was based on sales,
the average for FTC durable goods producers was 6.7% while
defense businesses experienced a rate of 4.7% (see Figure 5)
[3:43].
PROFITABILITY - RETURN ON SALES
10




FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION DURABLE GOODS
GOVERNMENT PROFIT CENTERS




This finding has appeared in other studies but there is less
than universal agreement on its significance. Others such
as Bohi, and Bicksler and Hess have found that defense
business is just as profitable as commercial business but
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that risk, efficiency and market stability are key factors
in determining profitability [6,5].
Second the study group determined that when profitability
was based on total assets of an entity that defense business
experienced a 13.5% return while commercial business had
only a 10.7% return. The effect of government owned equip-
ment was found to be minimal [37:8-10]. In developing a
comprehensive understanding of the profitability difference
when based on total assets, a comparison was made of invest-
ment levels between defense and commercial businesses.
Defense businesses were found to invest 35 cents for every
dollar of sales while commercial organizations invested 6 3
cents per dollar of sales. Thirteen cents of the difference
was due to the Governments methods of financing contracts-
progress and advance payments. The remaining 15 cents was
directly related to a lower level of facilities investment
by defense contractors [37:11].
The analysis of the data produced a productivity corol-
lary related to investment. Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Clements stated in his testimony before the Joint
Committee on Defense Production that
...if it is efficient in the commercial market-
place for the FTC durable good producers to employ
about 2-1/2 times the amount of facilities per
dollar of sales, compared to the defense producer
then there are probably productivity gains that
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GOVERNMENT PRESUMING CONTRACTOR FURNISHES'"
ALL EQUIPMENTS. FACILITIES
••••••••••• FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION DURABLE GOODS
SOURCES: Federal Trade Commission
Coopers & Lybrand [3;43]
Figure 6.
Not only was a detailed analysis of financial data
undertaken but 300 contracting officers and 200 companies
were surveyed as to their opinions on profit policy. These
groups were found .to have a modecura of support for basing
part of profit on investment and to have a concern that
the cost of capital should be more recognized as a portion
of product price [37:13].
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The major product of Profit 76 was Defense Procurement
Circular 76-3 [38]. This circular promulgated two major
changes to the DOD Profit Policy in hopes of raising the
level of contractor facility investments in defense business.
The first change made the imputed cost of capital for facility
investment as outlined in Cost Accounting Standard 414 an
allowable cost on most negotiated contracts. Second DPC 76-3
made the level of facility investment an important factor
in reaching a pre-negotiation objective. The details of the
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Figure 7. "Profit 76" Changes
Among the minor changes directed by DPC 76-3 was a
productivity reward. This tool was located under special
factors and was intended to motivate contractors to increase
productivity. Contractors were to receive a share of the
cost savings that resulted from the productivity improvements
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This approach was theoretically sound but practically fraught
with pit falls. The decision to implement the productivity
reward in spite of the obvious weaknesses was best character-
ized by Brigadier General James W. Stansberry. He stated:
...everybody was unanimous in their view that it
made sense to try to do it, even though we had not
solved all those problems yet. . .The advice from
our contracting officers and industry was give us
an open door to try it for a few years to see if





DPC 76-3 was published on 1 September 19 76 and became
effective 1 October 19 76. As foretold by the executive
summary to DPC 76-3, weaknesses in the new policy surfaced
[38:i]. Grady Jacobs, Chairman of the Defense Department
Contract Finance Committee outlined the four major weaknesses
of DPC 76-3 in an article in the January 19 80 issue of
"Contract Management" [20:11].
1. The return on facilities investment is not
adequate to be a positive motivation for
contractors to increase their facilities
investment.
2. Policy guidance for assigning weight to the
contract cost risk factor is not sufficient.
3. There are too many exceptions to a manufacturing
oriented profit policy.
4. The relationship between R&D and service
contract profit levels is not desirable.
In an attempt to overcome these weaknesses, DOD issued DPC
76-23 ;in February 1980. The weight given to the facilities
capital factor was increased to 16-20%, definitive guidance
was provided on the cost risk factor, and a separate profit
policy was set for research and development and service
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contracts. This separate direction was dictated by the
large volume of contracts (2 7% of FY78) that fell under
the exemption from complying with WGL [39:2] . Present DOD
Profit Policy is attached as Appendix A.
C. CONTINUING PROBLEMS
DOD has been studying, reviewing and implementing ways
to reduce the disincentives for investment and cost reduction
in its profit policy in hopes of encouraging private invest-
ment in productive plant and equipment. Unfortunately even
in light of the recent revision to DOD's Profit Policy
(DPC 76-23) , many of the original problems still exist.
One of the earliest problems, the disincentive to reduce
cost is still evident. After reviewing the present policy,
G. R. Simonson found that:
The nature of behavior which results in any kind
of situation depends significantly upon the system
of rewards being offered. In this sense defense
profit policy is economicallv inconsistent with
the qoals being sought of increased private capital
use and lower production costs. . .profits are
maximized by adopting low-capital use, high-cost
production methods to increase profits which are
a function of costs, and by increasing capital
use in non-defense production [36:63],
The converse relationship was confirmed by a study group at
the National Defense University. To date there is no
conclusive evidence that DOD's Profit Policy has caused any
contractor to make any substantial additional investments
[12:45]. This is supported by a GAO report that showed that
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the facilities capital factor in todays profit policy is too
small to be effective [41].
As recognized by Frank A. Shrontz, Assistant Secretary
of Defense, in his cover letter to DPC76-3, the causes for
"contractor reluctance to invest in modern machinery and
equipment for use on DOD contracts are many and varied [38:iJ
Many defense contractors seem to see more chances for higher
investments coming from these other sources. There appears
to be a sense among contractors that an unwritten or un-
spoken limit to profits has been reached or will soon be.
This unenunciated limit comes from public opinion , Congres-
sional oversight, the press, etc. Such a feeling among
defense contractors may be a good indicator that factors
outside present profit policy may effect investment more.
Factors like business stability, more liberal depreciation
policies, increased quantities may have more potential for
encouraging investment [12:45].
Another problem with today's profit policy is the
mechanism for sharing in saving from productivity enhancing
investments or decisions. The productivity reward under
special factors was designed with the intent of providing a
reward to contractors. The idea of reducing costs by in-
creasing productivity and thereby increasing profits is one
that is used by business quite often. Kaputys in reviewing
two major projects of a defense contractor, one commercial
and one military, found that there was much more awareness
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of a need to increase productivity and reduce cost in the
commercial project. He attributed this awareness to the
company's realization that any savings made would be returned
to the company as profits. This feeling was not so evident
in the defense project [21] . As the productivity reward
returns only a small percentage of the savings to the
contractor, its effectiveness is somewhat suspect.
These problems are not the only concerns with profit
policy but they are the most salient. They have been around
the longest and appear to push the policy in unintended
directions. Solutions to these problems will help bring
profit policy closer to realizing its goals and objectives.
D . SUMMARY
Before addressing Profit Policy's effectiveness, it is
important to understand the policy, its development, and
current position and problems of implementation. This
understanding provides the basis from which to analyze how
PCO's feel about the policy and its effectiveness. The
analysis of the PCO's feeling about profit policy will be
accomplished in Chapter IV.
45

IV. PRESENTATION OF THE SURVEY DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
As a result of changes in the complexity of weapons
systems and materials bought by DOD, the way in which it
acquires these items is very different than at the beginning
of World War II. No longer is price competition the prime
vehicle for buying weapons systems; the purchase of most
major systems is a negotiated process. DOD's Profit Policy
is one of the many policies, rules, regulations and statutes
created to ensure that the Government's best interests are
not trampled by contractors. In fulfilling this goal profit
policy has been subjected to constant study and review. At
each of the major changes in 196 3 and 19 76 studies have been
conducted that review the various aspects of the policy-
theory, contractors view, and Government Contracting person-
nel's perspective. A review of the literature shows that
outside of the major studies done at times of change very
little research on Government contracting personnel feelings
about DOD's Profit Policy has been undertaken. In an attempt
to fill a part of this void, this survey of Government
Procurement Contracting Officers was undertaken.
B. SURVEY BACKGOUND
Before developing a survey it was necessary to determine
what was going to be measured. The current DOD Profit
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Policy puts emphasis on
...effective contract performance by which overall
costs are economically controlled. .
.
(motivating)
contractors to provide their own facilities and
financing and to establish their competence through
development work undertaken at their own risk and
reward those who do so; and reward contractors for
productivity increases £ 13: 3-808, lbJ
.
Since an in depth study of possible problem areas in im-
plementing Profit Policy was done in conjunction with "Profit
76" [7] it was decided to find out whether or not PCO
s
felt the policy was meeting its goals. To accomplish this
the survey was structured around four areas that effect the
policy's effectiveness. These four areas were
1. Policy guidance
2. Organizational emphasis of the policy
3. Policy mechanics
4. Profit Policy's interaction with other policies
A copy of the survey is contained in Appendix B. The
questionnaires were sent to 25 major buying commands within
DOD. The names of the recipient commands are listed in
Appendix C.
As the profit policy is applicable to any type of
negotiated contract, no category of buying command was in-
tentionally excluded. This was done to get as complete a
picture of the PCO's views on the 'policy as possible.
However, there was one limitation. In order to elicit the
respondent's honest and candid responses no means of
determining the respondent's command was included in the
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questionnaire. It was felt that the information to be
gained by recognizing the responding command was over
shadowed by the need for truthful and complete answers.
Three steps were used to analyze the surveys. First,
they were all separated according to average dollar amounts
of contracts handled (contract value groups) . This was
done in order to determine if the PCO's opinions changed as
a function of the contract value group. Second the questions
with definite quantifiable responses were analyzed by using
a frequency distribution or an arithmetic average of the
responses. Third the indefinite responses and comments
were reviewed for content. These three methods were used
to develop the results outlined in the next section.
C. SURVEY RESPONSES
Of the 370 surveys sent to the 25 major DOD buying
activities, 125 were returned (a return rate of 33.8%). Due
to the indefinite nature of many of the questions on the
survey, many respondents chose not to answer all the questions
As a result, not all the totals and frequencies in the data
presentations will add up to 125.
1. Demographic Data
The first group of questions was developed to find
out background data on the respondents
.




The experience of the respondents ranged from one month to
30 years with the average being approximately nine years.
To provide a base from which to determine if educa-
tional level had a bearing on the respondents opinion of
the policy's effectiveness, each respondent was asked to
indicate his level of educational achievement.
Question 3. What is the highest educational level you
have achieved?
Those who had a bachelors degree or better constituted
77.6% of the respondents while 38.4% had a masters degree or
better. The results are shown in Table I.
TABLE I
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT LEVEL






or less 8 6.4 6.4
Some Bachelors
work 20 16 22.4
Bachelors
Degree 27 21.6 44
Some Masters
work 22 17.6 61.6
Masters
Degree 39 31.2 92.8
More Than
a Masters 9 7.2 100.0




Question 4. What is the average dollar value of the
contracts you presently work with?
This question was used to provide a basis from which
to see if the perception of Profit Policy's effectiveness
changed in relationship to the contract value groups. The
results were broken down into five groups instead of the six
indicated in the survey. Only four respondents indicated
handling $50-100 million contracts. As this number was in-
significant, these responses were incorporated with the
$25-50 million group, thus creating a $25-100 million group.
The responses were fairly evenly distributed among
the five groupings with the exception of the $1-25 million
group. It had almost twice as many responses as the other
four. Table II summarizes the data.
TABLE II











0-.5M 20 16 16.0
.5-1M 21 16.8 32.8
1-25M 40 32 64.8
25-100M 19 • 15.2 80.0
Over 100M 25 20 100.0
Total 125 100.0 100.0
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By combining all the demographic data into one table
(Table III) and segregating the data by contract value,
several general characteristics becomes evident. First, as
might be expected, the PCO ' s handling the larger dollar value
contracts have a higher educational level than those working
with smaller dollar values. Second those who work with con-
tracts valued at $0-500K have been in their present jobs












0-.5M 20 11.83 3.55
.5-1M 21 7.5 2.90
1-25M 40 6.07 4.02
25-100M 19 8.58 3.68
Over 10 0M 25 8.9 4.36
Total 125 8.98 3.73
* l=High School or less; 2=some bachelors work
3=Bachelors degree; 4=some masters work;




For any policy to be effective in accomplishing its
goals it must be accurately and completely transmitted to
those who implement the policy. Questions six and seven on
the survey were developed in order to determine what PCO '
s
felt about the guidance they had received on Profit Policy.
Question 6 . How would you classify the guidance you
have received on the use and implementation
of profit policy as it relates to your
every day interaction with the policy?
The respondents to this question seem to have a fairly
middle of the road opinion on the guidance for profit policy.













Excellent 9 7.2 7.4
Very Helpful 26 20.8 21.5
Helpful 46 36.8 38.0
Weak 35 28.0 28.9
Useless 5 4.0 4.1
No Response 4 3.2 Missing
Total 125 100.0 99.9
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When the responses were broken down by contract value
groups, the same distribution held true. Thus it would
appear that the guidance received by the PCO's is fairly
acceptable to them. The results are summarized in Table V.
TABLE V











Excellent 6 3 16 16
Very
Helpful 25 33 15 16 24
Helpful 35 44 36 26 48
Weak 40 11 41 37 8
Useless 6 5 5 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Question 7. Through what medium have you received most
of your guidance on implementing profit
policy?
The six sources of guidance were chosen to be repre-
sentative of the level of management usually associated with
that source. DAR is associated with DOD on a broad compre-
hensive policy and implementation basis. While one step
down, policy letters and directives are normally linked with
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, large claimants,
or DOD on a less broad basis. DOD Directive 5000.1 on
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major system acquisition is a good example. Instructions
and memoranda are normally issued by the buying commands
themselves and are concerned with the details of how to
accomplish particular actions. Finally direct supervisors
were included, based on the assumption that a PCO ' s immediate
and direct supervisor would have a major influence on the
PCO's actions.
As would be expected, the Defense Acquisition Regula-
tions were the number one source of guidance on profit policy.
The second and third sources were policy letters and direc-
tives. Fourth, fifth and sixth went respectively to instruc-
tions, memos, and direct supervisors. (See Table VI)
Of the nine who thought that the profit policy
guidance was excellent, four had been to a training session,
workshop, or seminar. Though these numbers are not large,
they do indicate a possible medium through which to inform
PCO's about profit policy. It may be possible to improve
their opinions of the guidance and therefore the policy by
holding some type of training sessions. Whether such an
approach would be effective is beyond the scope of this
research.
3. Organizational emphasis
As was seen in Chapter Three, Government contracting
officers' perceptions of management's support for a policy
can have a big impact on its effectiveness. DOD ' s Profit on
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ones was its apparent lack of support among high level
Government management [3:45]. In order to detect what
emphasis each PCO felt his organization placed on profit
policy, Question five was developed.
Question 5. Please list the following policies as to
their priority within your organization.
The results indicated that profit policy was not one
of the pre-eminent policies in the DOD acquisition process.
Of the five policy choices in the question, Competition by
a wide margin had top priority, followed by the policy on
Small and Disadvantaged Businesses (SDB) . These two policies
were the only ones with a clear cut ranking. The other three
almost seemed to make up a secondary tier of policies. Among
profit, standardization, and breakout, there does not appear
to be any one that dominates the others as competition and
SDB does these three. Such a secondary position in the
priorities of an organization may be a contributor to a
policy's ineffectiveness. If the investment of private
capital by defense contractors is vital to the nation's
security then it needs to have more management emphasis and
therefore attention from contracting officers. The impact
of such management attention is evident in the second place






(e.g., of those who indicated an opinion on competition,











1 72.5 16.5 10.7 5.4 4.5
2 12.5 42.6 19.6 13.4 16.4
3 8.3 20.9 28.6 14.3 25.5
4 3.3 13.0 19.6 35.7 24.5
5 3.3 7.0 21.4 31.3 29.1
Total 99.9 100.0 99.9 100.1 100.0
4 . Policy Mechanics and Operations
To determine if the present Profit policy in DAR was
meeting its objectives and goals, the following question was
asked:
Question 8. Do you feel that the present DOD Profit
Policy as stated in DAR paragraphs 3-80 8.1,
.7, and .8 is capable of motivating defense
contractors to invest in new and more pro-
ductive plant and equipment?
As shown in Table VIII, 71% of those responding felt
that profit policy was not capable of motivating contractors
to invest in plant and equipment. This is in line with the





IS PROFIT POLICY CAPABLE OF MOTIVATING





















Total 125 100.0 100.0
When the results shown in Table VIII are broken down by
contract value groups, each group follows the trend of the
whole sample with the exception of the $0-.5 million group,
The PCO's in this category overwhelmingly felt that the
present policy was capable of motivating contractors to
invest. The tabulated results are shown in Table IX.
TABLE IX
TABLE VIII RESPONSES BY CONTRACT VALUE GROUP
Response Contract Value Groups (M=$Millionl
0-.5M .5-1M 1-25M 25-100M Over 100M













Total 100 100 100 100 100
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In view of the controversy surrounding the profit
policy's ability to achieve its goal, the following question
was asked to determine whether profit was the appropriate
tool to increase investments by defense contractors.
Question 9. Do you feel that profit policy is the proper
tool for incentivizing contractors to in-
crease their investments in plant and
equipment?
The PCO's opinions on this question were not over-
i
whelmingly different. Profit policy was supported as the
proper tool to incentivize contractor investment by 4 3% of
the PCO's while 57% did not.
TABLE X
IS PROFIT POLICY THE PROPER TOOL





















Total 125 100.0 100.0
Segregating the above data by contract value groups,
as in Table XI, results in showing the PCO's opinion in a
different light. Those who handle contracts up to $25
million have opinions directly opposite those who handle
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contracts over $25 million. 53.3% of the under $25 million
group felt that profit policy was the correct tool while of
those handling actions over $25 million only 24.4% felt that
it was.
TABLE XI
IS PROFIT POLICY THE PROPER TOOL
TO ENCOURAGE CONTRACTOR INVESTMENT?
(By Contract Value Group)
Response Contract Value Groups





These questions generated a substantial number of
comments. Among those who indicated that profit policy was
not a proper tool, their comments fell in the following
categories:
1) The amount of incentive available was not
sufficient.
2) DOD programs lack stability
a. No guarantee of future business
b. Insufficient volume
3) Profit policy is only one tool among many.
4) The policy is cost based and not theoretically
sound.




The following opinions were expressed by a small number of
respondents from the same group:
1) Profit policy is short term, and capital ex-
penditures are long term.
2) Due to a winner take all philosophy, government
contracts are few and far between.
The PCO's who felt that profit policy was the proper tool
made comments that encompassed the following areas:
1) Contractors are only interested in profit.
2) Profit policy works if properly implemented and
monitored.
3) Best fits free market.
4) There is no alternative.
After determining the PCO's opinion on the overall
effectiveness of profit policy, Question 12 was designed to
find out if two key elements of the policy, the productivity
reward and facilities capital, were effective.
Question 12. In your experience has a contractor changed
his capital expenditures because of the
productivity reward or the facilities
capital sections of the weighted guidelines?
The results shown in Table XII indicate that these
two key elements have had little effect on contractors in-
vestment. 87.8% of the respondents felt that no contractor
investments had been made because of profit policy provisions.
The major weakness indicated by the comments was that the
rewards offered were too small and at the same time too hard
to administer. This feeling was reinforced by one response
which told of a PCO being laughed at by a contractor when
productivity reward was mentioned. Other weaknesses pointed
out by the comments are listed below:
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1) They are not applicable; competition and production
needs dictate investment.
2) Lack of program stability, insufficient quantities.
3) Government policy changes too often to make an
investment decision based on it.
4) Government contracting officers do not understand
productivity reward and/or are not allowed to
use it.
5) Since negotiations often end by agreeing on final
price, government ends up backing into profit
objective and therefore profit policy loses its
incentive
.
Of the PCO's answering question twelve only 12.2% said
that profit policy had caused a change in contractor behavior.
The comments made fell into two basic categories.
1) The key elements of profit policy help contractors
maximize profit.
2) They help a contractor quickly recoup costs.
TABLE XII
HAS A CONTRACTOR CHANGED HIS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES





















Total 125 100.0 100.0
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5 . Interaction With Other Policies
Question 10. What other Government, departmental,
agency, etc., policies do you feel have
a positive influence on the effective-
ness of the profit policy?
Question 11. What other policies do you feel have a
negative influence on the effective-
ness of DOD's Profit Policy?
The responses to these questions were many and varied.
The number of negative responses far out weighed the positive
The positive responses centered around the following policies
1) Multiyear Contracting
2) Need for Competition
3) CAS 414
4) Increased use of Firm Fixed Price Contracts
Additional comments were made concerning local actions that
had had a positive effect on profit policy. The comments
pointed to good local implementation and a good management
attitude toward profit.
The detrimental impact of the socio-economic goals
and plans applied to the contracting process was the major
negative response given to question eleven. Many felt that
the cost of implementing these socio-economic programs took
needed funds away from capital investment. This adds sup-
port to the finding that profit is a low priority policy in
the PCO's organizations. If PCO ' s feel that the effective-
ness of profit policy is hurt by socio-economic programs
and they observe that the policy on Small and Disadvantaged
Businesses is given a top priority in their organizations,
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it can mean only one thing— the objectives of profit policy
are not important enough to warrant their time and effort.
Therefore there is little reason to wonder why profit policy's
effectiveness is weak— there is not enough organizational
support. Based on these findings it would appear that DOD
has made the decision that the goals of the SDB policy are
presently more important than those of profit policy.
Additional comments centered on the following
policies having a negative effect on profit policy:
1) Weak Multiyear Contracting Policy
2) Tax Policies
3) Component Break out
4) CAS414— cost or a profit
Beyond the negative impact of stated Government
policies, respondents felt that there was an unstated policy
among higher levels of Government management that the only
good profit is a low one. This assertion was developed from
comments by PCO ' s on inconsistent implementation of profit
policy by Government management, arbitrary profit limits
set by local contract review boards, and the basing of
profit rates on prior contracts. One respondent cited an
example where the present profit policy was used to reward
and motivate as much as possible. This complete use of the
policy resulted in the small business contractor receiving
a profit rate of 21% on cost. When the contract review
board considered the contract, it was rejected and the PCO
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told to reduce the profit to 13%. Other responses also
cited arbitrary limitations set by local review boards as
problems. Some PCO s felt that compounding the above
problems was the winner take all characteristic of the
acquisition process.
6 . Recommended Improvements
Question 13. Do you have any recommendations for
improving the incentives mentioned in
the previous question?
The comments by those who gave specific recommendations
were small in numbers. Their recommendations were the
following:
1) Overhaul the weighted guidelines.
2) Force contractors to spend CAS 414 money on
plant and equipment.
3) Improve the productivity reward.
The majority of the PCO's who responded to this question
gave general recommendations for improving profit policy.
The most popular recommendation was a perceived need to
revise tax policies. The most desired revision to tax
policy was for faster depreciation of capital assets or a
large tax credit for investment. One respondent suggested
that any profits reinvested in the company's plant and
equipment should be tax free. A somewhat surprising and
popular recommendation was the need for additional training
of Government and contractor personnel in the use of profit
policy. Many PCO's seemed to feel that if the implementers
,
the negotiators and price analysts, were better trained
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and knew how to use the policy's incentives that the policy
would be more effective.
Three other recommendations were widely advocated,
but not to the extent of the two mentioned above. First,
it was recommended that DOD pay profits comparable to those
in the private sector. A related proposal urged a more
liberal view of what is an acceptable profit by DOD and the
elimination of unwritten limits on profit. Second, the wide
use of multi-year or long term contracts was recommended.
Finally the elimination of unallowable costs was proffered
as a way to improve profit policy. The most often mentioned
candidate for elimination was the unallowable expense for
interest.
The following are pertinent comments that do not fit
into any of the above recommendations:
1) Use some method not attached to negotiations.
2) Use long range dual source planning to establish
competition.
3) The Government should provide low cost loans for
plant and equipment.
D . SUMMARY
The main focus of this chapter has been to reflect the
major opinions of PCO's regarding the effectiveness of DOD's
Profit Policy. This was accomplished by examining the
responses made by PCO's to a questionnaire prepared by the
author. The questionnaire sought to express PCO opinion on
various aspects of the policy and its effectiveness. The
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responses to each of the survey questions, where applicable,
were summarized in tables or narrative form.
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V. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to contribute accurate
data reflecting DOD PCO ' s opinions on the effectiveness of
the Department of Defense's present profit policy. The
principal findings and conclusions were derived from the
questionnaire response data discussed in the previous
chapter:
1. DOD PCO's generally found profit policy ineffective
in motivating contractors to invest in more productive plant
and equipment. The present policy was not capable of
motivating defense contractors according to 71% of the
responding PCO's. Additionally the specific incentives of
facilities capital and the productivity reward are having
little or no effect on contractor investment. The survey
results showed that 87.2% of the PCO's felt that the con-
tractors they had worked with had not changed their capital
expenditure plans because of provisions of the profit policy.
2. In a related finding, the correctness of using profit
policy to motivate contractors to invest was supported by
53.3% of the PCO's handling contracts valued under $25 million
and was soundly rejected (only 24.4% supported profit policy




3. Major contributing factors to the policy's inef-
fectiveness were the impact of socio-economic programs
implemented through the contracting process and program in-
stability. Many responses cited the impression that the
cost to business of implementing these programs took needed
capital away from investment opportunities. The problems of
insufficient volume and uncertainty over future business
were major concerns expressed by the PCO's in the area of
program stability.
4. DOD Profit Policy is not a high priority policy
within DOD procuring activities. Only 30% of the PCO's in-
dicated that profit was a high priority policy in their
organizations while 85% and 59% respectively indicated that
competition and Small and Disadvantage Business policy
were top priorities in their organizations. The PCO's per-
ception of profit policy's low priority and the SDB policy's
much higher priority, in conjunction with the perceived
detrimental impact of socio-economic programs on profit
policy's effectiveness would seem to indicate that DOD has
decided that the SDB policy is more important than profit
policy. This conclusion leads to the assumption that present
Government management's emphasis is on the SDB policy and
not profit. This lack of emphasis on profit policy may be




5. There is an unstated policy among upper level
management in the DOD acquisition process that the only
good profit is a low one. PCO ' s mentioned contract review
boards as one source of such an unstated policy.
6. PCO's felt that changes in the tax laws and a
training program on profit policy would improve the policy's
effectiveness. The recommended changes in the tax laws
centered around the need for faster depreciation and/or a
tax credit for investment in plant and equipment. The need
for a training program was based on the PCO's perception
that many contracting personnel including upper level manage-
ment, did not understand profit policy and therefore could
not effectively use it.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. DOD should review the goals and objectives of profit
policy and determine what priority they should have in rela-
tion to other DOD policies. If its priority is found lacking
a profit policy training program should be initiated by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) . The participation
of OSD is critical because the apparent interest by DOD
leadership makes the importance of such a policy very
evident to other layers of management. This interest should
not be short lived but continue throughout the training
program. This program should impart to attendees not only
the mechanics of the policy and the theory and philosophy
behind it but also its goals and objectives.
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2. DOD should lend its support to legislation increasing
the rates of depreciation for plant and equipment. From the
responses given by the PCO's, it would appear that the pas-
sage of such legislation would substantially increase con-
tractor investment, one of profit policy's goals.
3. It is recommended that further research be conducted
in regards to whether profit policy is the proper tool for
motivating defense contractors to invest in plant and equip-
ment. The apparent difference in opinion among PCO's out-
lined in finding two indicates that there must be different
circumstances operating above and below the $25 million
dividing point. It is envisioned that further research
would provide a clear picture of the differences and there-
fore make it possible to improve profit policy's application




.'J-H08 Profit, Including Fees Under Cost-Reimbursement-Type
Contracts.
3-808.1 Policy.
(ai General. It is the policy of the Department of Defense to utilize profit to
.stimulate efficient contract performance Profit generally is the basic motive of
business enterprise. The Government and defense contractors should be con-
cerned with harnessing this motive to work for more effective and economical
contract performance. Negotiation of very low profits, the use of historical
averages, or the automatic application of a predetermined percentage to the
total estimated cost of a product, does not provide the motivation to accomplish
such performance. Furthermore, low average profit rates on defense contracts
overall are detrimental to the public interest. Effective national defense in a
free enterprise economy requires that the best industrial capabilities be
attracted to defense contracts. These capabilities will be driven away from the
defense market if defense contracts are characterized by low profit opportuni-
ties. Consequently, negotiations aimed merely at reducing prices by reducing
profits, with no realization of the function of profit, cannot be condoned. For
each contract in which profit is negotiated as a separate element of the contract




effective contract performance by which overall costs are economically con-
trolled. To this end, the profit objective must be fitted to the circumstances of
the particular acquisition, giving due weight to each of the effort, risk, facilities
investment, and special factors set forth in this 3-808. This will result in a wider
range of profits which, in many cases, will be significantly higher than previous
norms.
(b) Contracts Priced on the Barn's of Cost Analysis. When cost analysis is
performed pursuant to 3-807.2, profit consideration shall be in accordance with
the objectives set forth below. The Government should establish a profit
objective for contract negotiations, which will
—
(i) motivate contractors to undertake more difficult work requiring
higher skills and reward those who do so;
(ii) allow the contractors an opportunity to earn profits commensu-
rate with the extent of the cost risk they are willing to assume;
(iii) motivate contractors to provide their own facilities and financing
and to establish their competence through development work
undertaken at their own risk and reward those who do so; and
(iv) reward contractors for productivity increases.
The weighted guidelines method set forth in 3-808.2 for establishing profit
objectives is designed to provide reasonably precise guidance in applying these
principles. This method, properly applied, will tailor profits to the circum-
stances ofeach contract in such a way that long-range cost-reduction objectives
will be fostered, and a spread of profits will be achieved that is commensurate
with varying circumstances.
(c) Contracts Priced Without Cost Analysis. On many contracts and
subcontracts, good pricing does not require an examination into costs and
profits. Where adequate price competition exists, and in other situations where
cost analysis is not required (see 3-807), fixed-price-type contracts should be
awarded to the lowest responsible offerors without regard to the amount of
their profits. Under these circumstances, the profit that is anticipated or, in
fact, earned should not be ofconcern to the Government. In such cases, if a low
offeror earns a large profit, it should be considered the normal reward of
efficiency in a competitive system and efforts shall not be made to reduce such
profits.
3-808.2 Weighted Guidelines Method.
(a) General.
(1) The weighted guidelines method provides contracting officers with
(i) a technique that will insure consideration of the relative value of the
appropriate profit factors described in 3-808.4 in the establishment of a profit
objective and the conduct of negotiations; and (ii) a basis for documentation of
this objective, including an explanation of any significant departure from it in
reuching a final agreement. The contracting officer's analysis of these profit
factors is based on information available prior to negotiations. Such informa-
tion is furnished in proposals, audit data, performance reports, preaward
surveys and the like. Except as set forth in (b) below, the weighted guidelines





(i) the manufacturing ofsupplies and equipment;
(ii) research and development as described in 4-101(aX 1) through
(5), encompassing research, exploratory development, ad-
vanced development, engineering development, and opera-
tional systems development;
(iii) services as described in 4-101(aK6) and 22-101.
a. The profit objective for manufacturing contracts shall be computed,
except as indicated in e. below, using the manufacturing weighted guidelines
method, which provides profit opportunity based on facilities capital
investment.
b. The profit objective for research and development contracts shall be
computed using the research and development weighted guidelines method
unless, in the judgement of the contracting officer, a significant amount of
facilities is required for efficient contract performance, in which case the
manufacturing weighted guidelines shall be used.
c. The profit objective for service contracts shall be computed using the
service contract weighted guidelines method unless, in the judgement of the
contracting officer, a significant amount of facilities is required for efficient
contract performance, in which case the manufacturing weighted guidelines
shall be used.
d. In determining whether a particular contract shall be classified as
manufacturing, research and development, or services, primary reliance shall
be placed on the nature of the work to be performed, as indicated by the coding
for item 10A of the DD Form 350 (see DOD 4105.61-M, Department of Defense
Procurement Coding Manual, Volume 1), notwithstanding the appropriation
or negotiation authority used. The following guidelines shall apply:
(i) Manufacturing Weighted Guidelines. Contracts coded under
Section I, Part C, Supplies and Equipment,
(ii) Research and Development Weighted Guidelines. Contracts
coded under Section I, Part A, Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation, except for contracts coded as AD2-, Defense
Services, and A- -6, Management and Support,
(iii) Services Weighted Guidelines. Contracts coded under Section
I, Part B, Other Services and Construction; and under Section
I, Part A, as AD2- and as A- -. Note, however, that there are
blanket exceptions for certain services in 3-808.2(b).
e. The categories listed above are intended to be used as a point of
departure in determining which weighted guidelines method applies. Many
contracts for research and development and for services will require a signifi-
cant amount of facilities for efficient contract performance. When this is the
case, the manufacturing weighted guidelines method shall be used. Similarly,
certain contracts for the manufacture of small quantities of high technology
supplies and equipment may not require a significant amount of facilities. In
such cases, the research and development weighted guidelines method shall be
used. Contracting officers shall apply sound judgement in determining which
weighted guidelines method is most appropriate for a particular contracting




tion of alternative weighted guidelines methods shall not be a consideration in
making this determination.
f. In determining whether a significant amount of facilities is required
for efficient contract performance, the contracting officer should assess the
facilities needed, including contractor owned and leased and Government
owned. When there is a relatively small amount of facilities capital cost of
money allocated to the contract because some facilities are provided through
operating leases and by the Government, this does not necessarily mean that
an insignificant amount of facilities is required for efficient contract
performance.
g. When a method other than the manufacturing weighted guidelines
method is used to establish the prenegotiation profit objective, the profit
objective shall be reduced by the amount of facilities capital cost of money
allowed in accordance with 15-205.50. If the contractor does not propose this
cost, a provision shall be inserted in the contract that facilities capital cost of
money is not an allowable cost (see 3-501, Part I, Section H(iv)). On cost-plus-
award-fee contracts, the base fee shall be reduced by the amount of facilities
capital cost of money or the contract shall contain a provision to disallow the
cost.
(2) The contractor's proposal should include cost information for
evaluation and a total profit figure. Contractors shall not be required to submit
the details of their profit objectives but they shall not be prohibited from doing
so if they desire. Elaborate and voluminous presentations are neither required
nor desired and may indicate a low index of cost effectiveness, which fact itself
shall be taken into consideration by the contracting officer.
(3) The negotiation process does not contemplate or require agreement
on either estimated cost elements or profit elements, although the details of
analysis and evaluation may be discussed in the fact-finding phase of the
negotiation. If the difference between the contractor's profit objective and the
contracting officer's profit objective is relatively small, no discussion of individ-
ual factors may be necessary. If the negotiating parties' objectives are rela-
tively far apart, a disclosure ofweightings and rationale by both parties may be
made concerning the total assigned to contractor effort, contractor risk, facili-
ties investment, and special factors. By thus developing a mutual understand-
ing of the logic of the respective positions, an orderly progression to final
agreement should result. Simultaneous, not sequential, agreement will be
reached on cost, any incentive profit-sharing formulas or limitation on profits,
and price. The profit objective is a part of an overall negotiation objective
which, as a going-in objective, bears a distinct relationship to the target cost
objective and any proposed sharing arrangement. Since the profit is merely one
of several interrelated variables, the Government negotiator shall not com-
plete the profit negotiation without simultaneously agreeing on the other
vuriables. Specific agreement on the exact weights or values of the individual
factors is not required and shall not be attempted.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Under the following listed circumstances, other methods for estab-





(ii) Management contracts for operation and/or maintenance of
Government facilities;
(iii) Construction contracts;




(vii) Contracts not expected to exceed $100,000; and
(viii) Unusual pricing situations where the weighted guidelines
method has been determined to be unsuitable. Such excep-
tions shall be justified in writing and shall be authorized by
the head ofthe contracting activity.
(2) If the contracting officer makes a written determination that the
pricing situation meets any of the circumstances set forth above and that
application of the manufacturing weighted guidelines will result in an inequi-
table profit objective, other methods for establishing the profit objective may be
used. These methods shall be supported in a manner similar to that used in the
weighted guidelines (profit factor breakdown and documentation of profit
objectives); however, investment or other factors that would not be applicable
to the contract shall be excluded from the profit objective determination. It is
intended that the methods will result in profit objectives for noncapital
intensive contracts that are below those generally developed for capital inten-
sive contracts.
(c) Application to Subcontracts. The prime contractor may use the
weighted guidelines or a structured approach that discriminates among differ-
ent levels of investment if the acquisition would be subject to the weighted
guidelines under a prime contract. (For applicability see 3-1300.1(c).) If the
acquisition falls into one of the exceptions to the weighted guidelines in
3-808.2(bXl), the prime contractor may use another method to establish profit
objectives. In the absence of a structured approach that discriminates among
different levels of investment, similar to the weighted guidelines, the profit
objective will be reduced by the amount of facilities capital cost of money
allowed in accordance with 15-205.50.
(d) Limitation. In the event this or any other method would result in
establishing a fee objective in violation of limitations established by statute or
this regulation, the maximum fee objective shall be the percentage allowed
pursuant to such limitations. (See 3-405.) No local administrative ceilings on
profit shall be permitted.
3-808.3 Profit Objective.
(a) A profit objective is that part ofthe estimated contract price objective or
value which, in the judgment of the contracting officer, is appropriate for the
acquisition being considered, covering the profit or fee element of the price
objective. This objective should realistically reflect the total overall task to be
performed and the requirements placed on the contractor. Prior to the negotia-
tion of a contract, change order, or contract modification where cost analysis is




guidelines method, if applicable, shall be used for developing this profit
objective. Ifa change or modification is of a relatively small dollar amount and
is basically the same type of work as required in the basic contract, the
application of the weighted guidelines method will generally result in a profit
objective similar to the profit objective in the basic contract and, therefore, thi.s
basic rate may be applied to the contract change or modification. In cases where
the change or modification calls for substantially different work, then the basic
contract profit and the contractor's effort may be radically changed and a
detailed analysis is necessary. Also, if the dollar amount of the change or
contract modification is very significant in comparison to the contract dollar
amount, a detailed analysis shall be made.
lb) Development of a profit objective should not begin until after a
thorough
—
li) review ofproposed contract work;
(ii) review of all available knowledge regarding the contractor, pur-
suant to Section I, Part 9, including capability reports, audit data,
preaward survey reports and financial statements, as appropri-
ate; and
(iii) analysis ofthe contractor's cost estimate and comparison with the
Government's estimate or projection ofcost.
3-808.4 Profit Factors.
(a) The following factors shall be considered in all cases in which profit is to
be specifically negotiated. The weight ranges listed after each factor shall be








Subcontract Items 1 to 5% 1 to 5% 1 to 5%
Purchased Parts 1 to 4% 1 to 4% 1 to 4%
Other Material 1 to 4% 1 to 4% 1 to 4%
Engineering
Direct Labor 9 to 15% 9 to 15% N/A
Manufacturing
Direct Labor 5 to 9% 5 to 9% N/A
Services
Direct Labor N/A N/A 5 to 15%
Overhead N/A N/A 4 to 8%
Other
General Management 6 to 8% 6 to 8% 6 to 8%
B. CONTRACTOR RISK to 8% to 7% to 4%
C. FACILITIES INVESTMENT 16 to 20% N/A N/A
D SPECIAL FACTORS
Productivity See 3-808.8<a) N/A N/A
Independent Development 1 to 4% 1 to 4% N/A
Other -5 to +5% -5 to +5% -5 to +5%
* An adjustment factor of .7 is applied to the results of the Contractor Effort
evaluation to arrive at the dollar profit objective for this factor (see DD Form 1547). Also
see3-1300.5(aX2).
(b) Under the weighted guidelines method, the contracting officer shall
first measure the "Contractor's Effort" by the assignment of a profit percent-
age, within the designated weight ranges, to each element of contract cost
recognized by the contracting officer. Although certain classifications ofaccept-
able cost, including travel, subsistence, facilities, test equipment, special tool-
ing, federal manufacturers' excise taxes, and royalty expenses, may have been
historically excluded from the base upon which profit has been computed, they
shall not be excluded when using the weighted guidelines method. Not to be
included for the computation of profit as part of the cost base is the amount
calculated for the cost of money for facilities capital. How this cost is deter-
mined and how it will be applied and administered is fully set forth in 3-1300.
(c) The suggested categories under the Contractor's Effort are similar to
those on the Contract Pricing Proposul (DD Form 633). Often, individual
proposals will be in a different format, but, since these categories are broad and
basic, they provide sufficient guidance to evaluate all other items ofcost.
(d) After computing a total dollar profit for the Contractor's Effort, the
contracting officer then shall add the specific profit dollars assigned for cost
risk, facilities investment risk, and special factors. Weighted Guidelines
Profit/Fee Objective (DD Form 1547) is to be used, as appropriate, to facilitate
the calculation ofthis profit objective. (See F-200.1547.)
(e) The weighted guidelines method was designed for arriving at profit or
fee objectives for other than nonprofit organizations. However, if appropriate




organizations, the weighted guidelines method can be used as a basis for
arriving at fee objectives for nonprofit organizations. Therefore, the polity of
the Department of Defense is to use the weighted guidelines method, as
modified in (2) below, to establish fee objectives that will stimulate efficient
contract performance and attract the best capabilities of nonprofit organiza-
tions to defense-oriented activities. The modifications shall not be applied as
deductions against historical fee levels but to the fee objective for such a
contract, as calculated under the weighted guidelines method.
(D For purposes of this subparagraph, nonprofit organizations are
defined as those business entities organized and operated exclusively for
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, of which no part of the net
earnings inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, of which
no substantial part of the activities is carrying on propaganda or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation or participating in any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office, and which are exempt from Federal
income taxation under Section 501 ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
(2) For contracts with nonprofit organizations where fees are involved,
the following adjustments are required in the weighted guidelines method.
(i) An adjustment of -1 percent of the total effort shall be
assigned in all cases where the manufacturing weighted
guidelines method is used. An adjustment of-3 percent of the
total effort shall be assigned in all cases where the research
and development or services weighted guidelines method is
used,
(ii) The weight range under "Contractor Cost Risk" shall be -1
percent to percent in lieu of percent to 8 percent for
contracts with those nonprofit organizations, or elements
thereof, identified by the Secretary of Defense or the Secre-
tary of a Department (or their respective designees) as receiv-
ing sustaining support on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis from a
particular Department or Agency of the Department of
Defense.
(0 In making a judgment of the value ofeach factor, the contracting officer
should be governed by the definition, description, and purpose of the factors,
t< igether with considerations for evaluating them as set forth herein.
3-808.5 Contractor Effort.
(a) General. This factor is a measure of how much the contractor is
expected to contribute to the overall effort necessary to meet the contract
performance requirements in an efficient manner. This factor, which is apart
from the contractor's responsibility for contract performance, takes into ac-
count what resources are necessary and what the contractor must do to
accomplish a conversion of ideas and materials into the final product called for
in the contract. This is a recognition that, within a given performance output or
within a given sales dollar figure, necessary efforts on the part of individual
contractors can vary widely in both value and quantity, and that the profit




to tutu! performance. The evaluation of this factor requires an analysis of the
cost content of the proposed contri t us follows.
(b) Material Acquisition (Subcontracted Items, Purchased Parts, and
Other Material). Analysis of these cost items shall include an evaluation of the
managerial and technical effort necessary to obtain the required purchased
parts, subcontracted items, and other materials, including special tooling. This
evaluation shall include consideration of the number of orders and suppliers
and whether established sources are available or new sources must be devel-
oped. The contracting officer shall also determine whether the contractor will
obtain the material and tooling by routine orders from readily available
supplies (particularly those of substantial value in relation to the total contract
cost) or by detailed subcontracts, for which the prime contractor will be
required to develop complex specifications involving creative design or close
tolerance manufacturing requirements. Consideration shall be given to the
managerial and technical efforts necessary for the prime contractor to adminis-
ter subcontracts and select subcontractors, including efforts to break out
subcontracts from sole sources through the introduction of competition. These
determinations shall be made for purchases of raw materials or basic commodi-
ties, purchases of processed material, including all types of components of
standard or near standard characteristics, and purchases of pieces, assemblies,
subassemblies, special tooling, and other products special to the end item. In
the application of this criterion, it should be recognized that the contribution of
the prime contractor to his purchasing program may be substantial. This may
apply in the management ofsubcontracting programs involving many sources,
new complex components and instrumentation, incomplete specifications, and
close surveillance by the prime contractor's representative. Recognized costs
proposed as direct material costs, like scrap charges, shall be treated as
material for profit evaluation. If intracompany transfers are accepted at price,
in accordance with 15-205. 22(e), they shall be evaluated as material. Other
intracompany transfers shall be evaluated by individual components of cost,
i.e., material labor, and overhead. Normally, the lowest unadjusted weight for
direct material is 2 percent. A weighting of less than 2 percent would be
appropriate only in unusual circumstances when there is a minimal contribu-
tion by the contractor.
(c) Conversion (Engineering, Manufacturing, and Service Labor). Analysis
of the engineering, manufacturing, and service labor items of the cost content
of the contract shall include evaluation of the comparative quality and level of
the engineering talents, manufacturing and service skills, and experience to be
employed. In evaluating engineering labor for the purpose of assigning profit
dollars, consideration shall be given to the amount of notable scientific talent
or unusual or scarce engineering talent needed in contrast to journeyman
engineering effort or supporting personnel. The diversity, or lack thereof, of
scientific and engineering specialties required for contract performance and
the corresponding need for engineering supervision and coordination shall be
evaluated. Similarly, the variety of manufacturing labor skills required and
the contractor's manpower resources for meeting these requirements shall be




assigning higher weights to engineering or professional-type skills and lower
weights to semiprofessional or other type skills required for contract perfor-
mance. A weighting in excess of 10 percent for service contract labor will be
justified normally only when the quality, skill, and experience of the service
contract labor warrants a corresponding weighting under a research and
development contract.
(d) General Management (Overhead and G&A).
(1) Analysis of these overhead items of cost includes the evaluation of
the makeup of these expenses and how much they contribute to contract
performance. This analysis shall include a determination of the amount of
labor within these overhead pools and how this labor would be treated if it were
considered as direct labor under the contract. The allocable labor elements
shall be given the same profit consideration that they would receive if they
were treated as direct labor. The other elements of these overhead pools shall
be evaluated to determine whether they are routine expenses, like utilities,
depreciation, and maintenance, and hence given lesser profit consideration, or
whether they are significant contributing elements. The composite of the
individual determinations in relation to the elements ofthe overhead pools will
be the profit consideration given the pools as a whole. The procedure for
assigning relative values to these overhead expenses diflers from the method
used in assigning values of the direct labor. The upper and lower limits
assignable to the direct labor are absolute. In the case of overhead expenses,
individual expenses may be assigned values outside the range as long as the
composite ratio is within the range.
(2) It is not necessary that the contractor's accounting system break
down the overhead expenses within the classifications ofengineering overhead,
manufacturing overhead, and general and administrative expenses, unless
dictated otherwise by Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). The contractor whose
accounting system only reflects one overhead rate on all direct labor need not
change the system (ifCAS exempt) to correspond with the above classifications.
In evaluating such a contractor's overhead rate, the contracting officer can
break out the applicable sections of the composite rate which can be classified
as engineering overhead, manufacturing overhead, and general and adminis-
trative expenses and follow the appropriate evaluation technique.
(3) There is a critical factor to consider in the determination of profit in
this urea. Management problems surface in various degrees and the manage-
ment expertise exercised to solve them shall be considered as an element of
profit. For example, a new program for an item that is on the cutting edge ofthe
state of the art will cause more problems and require more managerial time
and abilities ofa higher order than a follow-on contract. Ifnew contracts create
more problems and require a higher profit weight, follow-ons shall be adjusted
downward as many of the problems shall have been solved. In any event an
evaluation shall be made of the underlying managerial effort involved on a
case-by-case basis.
(4) It may not be necessary for the contracting officer to make a
separate profit evaluation of overhead expenses with each acquisition of




the pro/it weight to be assigned to the overheud pool has been made, the weight
assigned may be used for future contracts with the same contractor until there
is a change in the cost composition of the overhead pool or the contract
circumstances, or until the factors discussed in (3) above are relevant.
3-808.6 Contract Cost Risk.
(a) General.
(1) This factor reflects the policy of the Department of Defense that
contractors bear an equitable share of contract cost risk, and to compensate
them for the assumption of that risk. A contractor's risk associated with costs
to perform under a Government contract is usually minimal under cost-
reimbursement-type contracts. However, as acquisitions progress from basic
research through follow-on production and supply contracts, the use of in-
creased contractor-risk-assumption-type contracts is appropriate for increas-
ing the contractor's responsibility for performance. The generally accepted
progression of the acquisition spectrum ranging from basic research through
supply acquisitions and from cost to firm fixed-price contracts, is shown below:
TYPE OF EFFORT TYPE OF CONTRACT
1. Basic Research Cost, CPFF
2. Applied Research Cost, CPFF
3. Exploratory Development Cost, CPFF
4. Advanced Development CPFF, CPAF
5. Engineering Development CPFF, CPAF, CPIF
6. Operational System Development CPIF, CPAF, FPI
7. First Production FPI
8. Follow-on Production FPI, FFP
9. Supply FFP
Research and the various categories ofdevelopment are defined in 4-101.
(2) In developing the prenegotiation profit objective, the contracting
officer will need to consider strongly the type of contract anticipated to be
negotiated and the associated contractor risk when selecting the position in the
weight range for profit that is appropriate for the risk to be borne by the
contractor. This is one of the most important factors in arriving at prenegotia-
tion profit objectives.
(b) Evaluation ofContractor's Assumption ofCon tract Cost Risk.
(1) Evaluation of this risk requires a determination of (i) the degree of
cost responsibility the contractor assumes, (ii) the reliability of the cost
estimates in relation to the task assumed, and (iii) the complexity of the task
assumed by the contractor. This factor is specifically limited to the risk of
contract costs. Thus, such risks on the part of the contractor as reputation,
losing a commercial market, losing potential profits in other fields, or any risk
on the part of the contracting activity, such as the risk of not acquiring an
effective weapon, are not within the scope ofthis factor. ^
(2) The first and basic determination of the degree of cost responsibil-
ity assumed by the contractor is related to the sharing of total risk by contract
cost by the Government and the contractor through the selection of contract




contractor use his best efforts to perform a task, and a firm fixed-price contract
for a complex item. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract reflects a minimum assump-
tion of cost responsibility, whereas a firm fixed-price contract reflects a com-
plete assumption ofcost responsibility.
(3) The second determination is that of the reliability of the cost
estimates. Sound price negotiation requires well-defined contract objectives
and reliable cost estimates. Prior production experience assists the contractor
in preparing reliable cost estimates on new contracts for similar equipment. An
excessive cost estimate reduces the possibility that the cost of performance will
exceed the contract price, thereby reducing the contractor's assumption of
contract cost risk.
(4) The third determination is that of the difficulty of the contractor's
task. The contractor's task can be difficult or easy, regardless of the type of
contract.
(5) Contractors are likely to assume greuter cost risk only if contract-
ing officers objectively analyze the risk incident to proposed contracts and are
willing to compensate contractors for it. Generally, a cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tract will not justify a reward for risk in excess of 0.5 percent, nor will a firm
fixed-price contract justify a reward of less than the minimum on the weighted
guidelines. Where proper contract-type selection has been made, the reward for
risk, by contract type, will usually fall into the following percentage ranges:
(i) type of contract and percentage ranges for profit objectives
developed by using the manufacturing weighted guidelines
method:
Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee to 0.5%
Cost-Pius-Incentive Fee
With Cost Incentives Only 1 to 2%
With Multiple Incentives 1.5 to 3%
Fixed-Price-Incentive
With Cost Incentives Only 3 to 5%
With Multiple Incentives 4 to 6%
Prospective Price Redetermination 4 to 6%
Firm Fixed-Price 6 to 8%
(ii) type of contract and percentage ranges for profit objectives
developed by using the research and development weighted
guidelines method:
Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee to 0.5%
Cost-Pius-Incentive Fee
With Cost Incentives Only 1 to 2%
With Multiple Incentives 1.5 to 3%
Fixed-Price-Incentive
With Cost Incentives Only 2 to 4%
With Multiple Incentives 3 to 5%
Prospective Price Redetermination 3 to 5%




(iit) type of contract and percentage ranges for profit objectives;
developed by using the service contract weighted guidelines
..^ method:
Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee to 0.5%
Cust-Plus-Incentive Fee 1 to 2'T
Fixed-Price-Incentive 2 to 3%
Firm Fixed-Price o1 to 4%
a. These ranges may not be appropriate lor all acquisitions. For
instance, a lixed-price-iucentive contract that is closely priced with a low
ceiling price and high incentive share may be tantamount to a firm fixed-price
contract. In this situation, the contracting officer may determine that a basis
exists for high confidence in the reasonableness of the estimate and that little
opportunity exists for cost reduction without extraordinary efforts. On the
other hand, a contract with a high ceiling and low incentive formula can be
considered to contain cost-plus-incentive-lee contract features. In this situa-
tion, the contracting officer may determine that the Government is retaining
much of the contract cost responsibility and that the risk assumed by the
contractor is minimal. Similarly, if a cost-pius-incentive-fee contract includes
an unlimited downward (negative) fee adjustment on cost control, it could be
comparable to a fixed-price-incentive contract. In such a pricing environment,
the contracting officer may determine that the Government has transferred a
greater amount of cost responsibility to the contractor than is typical under a
normal cost-plus-incentive-fee contract.
b. The contractor's subcontracting program may have a significant
impact on the contractor's acceptance of risk under a contract form. It can
cause risk to increase or decrease in terms of both cost and performance. This
consideration shall be a part of the contracting officer's overall evaluation in
selecting a factor to apply for cost risk. It may be determined, for instance, that
the prime«contractor has effectively transferred real cost risk to a subcontrac-
tor and the contract cost risk evaluation, as a result, may be below the range
that would otherwise apply for the contract type being pro[>osod. This situation
will be found to exist only in a few extraordinary situations under circum-
stances of (i) a follow-on production contract, in which a substantial portion of
the total contract costs represents a single subcontract or a few subcontracts,
(ii) the fullest incentive reward and penalty feature on cost performance
having been passed by the prii 3 contractor to the subcontractor. In an
acquisition in which all of these circumstances are found to exist, a lower than
usual profit weight may be applied to the aggregate of all recognized costs
including the subcontract portion. The contract cost risk evaluation shall not
be lowered, however, merely on the basis that a substantial portion of the
contract costs represents subcontracts without any substantial transfer of
contractor's risk, since this can result eventually in a lessening of the amount
ofwork let on subcontracts.
c. In making a contract cost risk evaluation in an acquisition that
involves definitization of a letter contract, unpriced change orders, and un-
priced orders, under BOAs, consider the effect on total contract cost risk as a




stances it may be reasoned that the total amount of cost ri.sk has been
effectively reduced. Under othei circumstances it may be apparent that the
contractor's cost risk remained substantially unchanged. To be equitable, the
determination of a profit weight for application to the total of all recognized
costs, both those incurred and those yet to be expended, must be made with
consideration to alfatlendant circumstances and not be just the portion of costs
incurred, or percentage ofwork completed, prior to defmitization,
d. Time and material, labor hour, and overhaul contracts priced on a
time and material basis shall be considered to be cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts
for the purpose of establishing a profit weight in the evaluation of the
contractor's assumption ofcontract cost risk.
e. In determining the contract cost risk percentage under CONTRAC-
TOR RISK in profit factors of the weighted guidelines provided in 3-808. 4(a), it
is appropriate to consider additional risks associated with foreign military
sales (FMS). To be recognized, an additional cost risk factor shall be demon-
strated by the contractor to be significant and over and above that normally
present in DoD contracts for similar items. If an additional cost risk factor
associated with FMS is recognized, the total profit under the CONTRACTOR
RISK section (3-808. 4(a)) shall not exceed the limits set forth in 3-808.6(bx5)
lor different types of contracts. For example, when the manufacturing
weighted guidelines method is used, the limitation will be 0.5 percent for CPFF
contracts, 3 percent for CPIF contracts, 6 percent for FPI contracts and 8
percent for FFP contracts. The additional cost risk factor shall not apply to
foreign military sales made from inventories or stocks nor to acquisitions made
under DoD cooperative logistics support arrangements.
3-808.7 Facilities Capital Investment. This element relates to the consider-
ation to be given in the profit objective in recognition of the investment risk
associated with the facilities employed by the contractor. Sixteen to twenty
percent of the net book value of facilities capital allocated to the contract is the
normal range of weight for this profit factor. The key factors that the contract-
ing officer shall consider in evaluating this risk are:
(i) the overall cost effectiveness ofthe facilities employed;
(ii) whether the facilities are general purpose or special purpose
items;
(iii) the age ofthe facilities;
(iv) the undepreciated value of the facilities;
(vj the relationship of the remaining writeoff life of the investment
and the length of the program(s) or contract(s) on which the
facilities are employed; and
(vi) special contract provisions that reduce the contractor's risk of
recovery of facilities capital investment (termination-protection
clauses, multiyear cancellation ceilings, etc.).
To assist in evaluating new investment, the contracting officer should request
the contractor to submit reasonable evidence that the new facilities are part of
an approved investment plan and that achievable benefits to the Government
will^ result from the investment. New industrial facilities and equipment shall





(i) are to be acquired by the contractor primarily Cor defense
business;
(ii) have a long service life;
(iii) have a limited economic life due to limited alternative uses; and
(iv) reduce the total life cycle cost of the products produced for the
Department of Defense.
To the extent that the new investment represents routine replacement of
existing assets, a lesser weight shall be assigned.
3-808.8 Special Factors.
( a I Productivity.
(1) General. A key objective of the DoD profit policy is to reduce the
cost of defense preparedness by incentivizing defense contractors' investment
in modern cost-reducing facilities and other improvements in efficiency. To the '
extent that costs serve as the basis for pricing (both cost and profit), success in
reducing costs can serve, in turn, to reduce profit dollars opportunity. For
example, a fixed-price incentive-type contract is typically used for the first
production contract of a major weapon system program. The incentive to
increase productivity and reduce cost within one contract works against a
contractor on follow-on production contracts because the reduced level of cost
becomes a part of the basis for pricing subsequent contracts. In order to
mitigate the loss of profit dollars opportunity that occurs when costs are
reduced due to productivity gains, a special "Productivity Reward" may be
included in the prenegotiation profit objective of a pending acquisition under
certain circumstances.
(2) Applicability Criteria. The "Productivity Reward" may be applied
when the following criteria are met:
(i) The pending acquisition involves a follow-on production
contract,
(ii) Reliable actual cost data is available to establish a fair and
reasonable cost baseline,
(iii) Changes made in the configuration of the item being acquired
are not of sufficient magnitude to invalidate price
comparability.
(3) Implementation Procedures. The amount of productivity reward
for a given contract is based on the estimated cost reduction that can be
attributed to productivity gains. Set forth below are principles and procedures
that apply to estimating cost reductions and calculating the productivity
reward:
(i) The contractor shall prepare and support the cost reduction
estimate.
(ii) The overall contract cost decrease shall be based on estimated
decreases measured at the unit cost level.
(iii) The lowest average unit cost (exclusive of profit) for a preced-
ing production run shall serve as the unit cost baseline.
(iv) A technique shall be employed to determine that portion of




posed to the effects of quantity differences between the base
contract and the pending acquisition.
(v) When the parties agree that the estimated overall contract
cost decrease is materially affected by price level differences
between the base period and the current point in time, an
economic price adjustment muy be applied to the estimate.
Ivi) The productivity reward shall be calculated by multiplying
the contract cost decrease due to productivity gains by the
base profit objective rate.
(vii) The degree of review and validation of the data supporting
the productivity reward calculation shall be commensurate
with the materiality of this profit element in relation to the
overall price objective.
There may be several methods advanced, by both contracting officers and
contractors, to quantify productivity gains. Any technique may be acceptable,
provided it takes into account equitably the principles and procedures listed
above.
(b) Independent Development. Contractors who develop items that have
potential military application without Government assistance are entitled to
special profit consideration on those items as a special profit factor to be
considered within the weighted guidelines in arriving at a profit objective. One
to four percent ofrecognized cost is established as the normal range of value for
this profit factor. The criteria for selection of the specific percentage shall be
the importance of the development in advancing defense purposes, the demon-
stratable initiative in determining the need and application of the develop-
ment, the extent of the contractor's cost risk, and whether the development
cost was recovered directly or indirectly from Government sources.
(c) Other Factors. A composite percentage weight within the range of -5
percent to +5 percent of the basic profit objective may be assigned to other
profit factors in arriving at the total profit objective. These other profit factors,
which may apply to special circumstances or particular acquisitions, relate to
contractor participation in the Government's Small Business, Small Disadvan-
taged Business, and Labor Surplus Programs, and to special situations not
specifically set forth elsewhere in these guidelines. Participation that is rated
as merely satisfactory shall be assigned a weight of zero, generally. Evidence of
energetic support may justify a plus weight and poor support a negative weight.
Special situations may be assigned either a plus or minus weight depending on
the particular circumstances ofthe acquisition.
(1) Small Business and Small Disadvantaged Business Participation.
The contractor's policies and procedures that energetically support Govern-
ment small business and small disadvantaged business subcontracting pro-
grams, pursuant to 1-707 and 1-332, shall be given favorable consideration. Any
unusual effort that the contractor displays in subcontracting with small
business or small disadvantaged business concerns, particularly for
development-type work likely to result in later production opportunities, and
the overall effectiveness of the contractor in subcontracting with and furnish-




unwillingness on the part of the contractor to support Government small
business or small disadvantaged business policies shall he viewed as evidence of
poor performance for the purpose ofestablishing a profit objective.
(2) Labor Surplus Area Participation. A similar review and evaluation
(as required in tl) above) shall be given to the contractor's policies and
procedures supporting the Government's Labor Surplus Area Program, pur-
suant to 1-805.1. In particular, favorable consideration shall be given to a
contractor who (i) makes a significant effort to help find jobs and provide
training ("or the hardcore unemployed, or (ii) promotes maximum subcontrac-
tor utilization ofcertified eligible concerns, as defined in 1-801.1.
(3) Energy Conservation. Favorable consideration shall be given to the
contractor's initiatives and accomplishments in the conservation ofenergy.
(4) Special Situations. Particular situations may justify use of a profit
factor other than those specifically identified in these guidelines. These situa-
tions shall be identified and the reason(s) for their use documented in the
records of price negotiation. Examples of such situations include contractor
effort to exploit additional production cost-reduction opportunities or to im-








Director of Procurement & Production
Headquarters
,
U.S. Army Material Readiness Command
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809
Dear Sir
I am presently enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School at
Monterey, California where I am studying Acquisition and Contract
Management. In partial completion of the requirements for
graduation, I am researching and writing a thesis on "DOD's Profit
Policy--Its Effectiveness, The Contracting Officer's View."
During the course of my studies, I have found that alot has been
written on the pros and cons of DOD's Profit Policy, but that most
of it has been from the perspective of the businessman,
policymakers, politicians and academicians. The objective of my
research is to try and find out what the Contracting Officers, the
policy imp 1 ementer s , the day to day users of the policy feel about
its effectiveness. This information will be gathered by means of
a survey that I am sending to all the major buying commands within
the Department of Defense.
In order to achieve my objectives, I would appreciate it if
you would distribute the enclosed surveys to the warranted
contracting officers in your organization and encourage them to
return it by the end of October. Your assistance in this endeavor
will be greatly appreciated. Thank you very much.
^Jery respectfully




DOD PROFIT POLICY SURVEY
In the course of preparing my thesis toward satisfying graduation require-
ments at the Naval Postgraduate School, I am researching the effectiveness of
DOD's Profit Policy as stated in DAR 3-808 in incentivizing defense contractors
to invest in new plant and equipment. My goal is to determine what DOD
Contracting Officers perceive the policy's effectiveness to be. Also the
responses will hopefully point toward any needed changes or improvements.
In order to determine the perceptions of Contracting Officers, it would
be appreciated if you would take just a few minutes to fill out this short
questionaire and return it to me in the envelope provided. I am looking
for your own thoughts and ideas. Any past experiences that you may wish
to include in your responses will be appreciated. Please be candid and
honest in your responses as the anonymity of respondents will be maintained.
I am planning to consolidate the data that you provide at the end of
October and will be very grateful if you help me meet this deadline.






Thomas P. Anderson, IV
LT, SC, USN
BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
1. How many years experience do you have in your present position?
2. Do you have any related job experience in positions other than your
present position? If so, what type of experience? (Optional)
3. What is the^ighest educational level you have achieved?
High school or less Some Bachelor's work Bachelor's degree
Some Master's work Master's degree More than a Master's degree
4. What is the average dollar value of the contracts you presently work with?
Less than $500,000 500,000 to 1 million 1 to 25 million
25 to 50 million 50 to 100 million Greater than 100 million
POLICY QUESTIONS
5« Please list the following policies as to their priority within your
organization? (One is the highest and five is the lowest)




6» How would you classify the guidance you have received on the use and
implementation of profit policy as it relates to your every day interaction
with the policy?
Excellent Very helpful Helpful Weak Useless
7» Through what medium have you received most of your guidance on imple-
menting profit policy? (List in numerical order
—
l indicating the most)
Directives Instructions Memos Policy Letters
DAR Direct Supervisor Other (list)
8» Do you feel that the present DOD Profit Policy as stated in DAR Paragraphs
3-808. j_, .7 , and. 8 is capable of motivating defense contractors to invest
in new and more productive plant and equipment? Yes No
9« Do you feel that profit policy is the proper tool for incentivizing
contractors to increase their investments in plant and equixjment?
Yes No Why?
10. What other Government, departmental, agency, etc., policies do you feel
have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the profit policy and why?
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11 • What other policies do you feel have a negative influence on the effective-
ness of DOD's Profit Policy and why?
1 2 • In your experience has a contractor changed his capital expenditures
because of the productivity reward or the facilities capital sections of the
weighted guidelines? Why or why not?
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1 3 » Do you have any recommendations for improving the incentives mentioned
in the previous question? If so, what?
!*+• If you have any other comments on the DOD's Profit Policy implementation




ACTIVITIES RECEIVING THE QUESTIONNAIRE
NAVY
Naval Sea Systems Command
Washington, D.C. 20 36 2
Naval Air Systems Command
Washington, D.C. 20 361
Naval Electronics Systems Command
Washington, D.C. 20360
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Defense Electronics Supply Center
Dayton, Ohio 45444
Defense General Supply Center
Richmond, Virginia 2 3219
Defense Industrial Supply Center
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19111
Defense Construction Supply Center
Columbus, Ohio 43215
AIR FORCE
Headquarters Aeronautical Systems Division
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433
Space and Missile Test Organization
Vandenberg AFB, California 9 3437
Space Division
Los Angeles AFS, California 90009
Headquarters Electronic Systems Division
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts 01731
Armament Division




Tinker AFB, Oklahoma 73145
Sacramento ALC
McClellan AFB, California 95652
Warner Robins ALC
Robins AFB, Georgia 31098
San Antonio ALC
Kelly AFB, Texas 78241
Ogden ALC
Hill AFB, Utah 84406
ARMY
U.S. Army Missile Command
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35 809
Headquarters U.S. Army Aviation, Research and
Development Command
St. Louis, Missouri 63166
U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Materiel
Readiness Command
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 770 3
U.S. Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command
Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois 61201
U.S. Army Troop Support and Aviation Readiness Command
St. Louis, Missouri 63120
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Research and Development
Command
Warren, Michigan 48090
U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Materiel Readiness Command
Warren, Michigan 4 8090'
U.S. Army Materiel Readiness Command
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